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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the evolution of total factor productivity growth and 
market power in Spain during the period 1983-1996. The data consists of a large 
firm level data set that encompasses all sectors of economic activity apart from 
financial institutions. The results show that traditional growth accounting yield 
poor results when applied to firm level data. It is argued that the presence of 
market power is the main culprit for these findings. Using different specifications 
and estimation techulques, the paper then goes on to identify the amount of 
market power found in the Spanish economy. 
1. Introduction 
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth has received growing attention over recent 
years. Most of the literature examines TFP growth at the level of the entire econ­
omy, and only few papers have ventured to examine the evolution at the sectoral 
level. Data limitation have seriously hindered work at the level of individual firms. 
This paper argues that sectoral, and even more so, aggregate measures of TFP 
growth give a misguided picture of the underlying market structure. The basic 
argument is that the way data are collected and aggregated in national accounts 
will mechanically generate a well behaved aggregate Cobb-Douglas function with 
constant returns to scale for the economy, a finding consistent with perfect compe­
tition (J. Felipe and J.S.L. McCombie (1998)). The latter is a widespread finding 
in the empirical literature, and has sometimes been interpreted as a validation of 
the Cobb-Douglas cum perfect competition view of the world. 
Hall's (1986) pioneering work on the cyclical behaviour of TFP has shed new 
light on this issue. He demonstrated that the behaviour of the Solow residual was 
incompatible with the hypothesis of perfect oompetition and constant returns to 
scale. Hall's (1986) first findings implied an important degree of market power. 
He then showed that the most probable causes for high price to marginal oost 
ratios were increasing returns. Indeed, the level of pure profits implied by his 
estimates were too high in the context of the US economy, and he showed that 
these could be attributed to the existence of fixed costs. 
A number of subsequent papers proposed alternative explanations for the be­
haviour of the Solow residual over the US cycle. Caballero and Lyons (1992) 
provide evidence that is compatible with the presence of increasing returns at the 
level of the industry and/or the whole economy. A possible explanation for this 
finding may be related to presence of thick market externalities. This hypothe­
sis implies that the productivity of existing factors increases with the number of 
transactions. It may be an industry or firm specific phenomenon. In addition, the 
original hypotheses proposed by Hall (market power and increasing returns) have 
been pursued. Roeger (1995) shows that imperfect competition can explain the 
behaviour of TFP, while Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) have confirmed 
the existence of market power. Basu and Fernald (1997) highlight the importance 
of firm heterogeneity to interpret the finding of important increasing returns at 
the aggregate level. Basu (1996) shows that once capacity utilisation is properly 
oontrolled for, increasing returns are of seoondary importance. Burnside (1996) 
argues that increasing returns beoome negligible once heterogeneity and capacity 
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utilisation are properly accounted for. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, (1995) 
also highlight the importance of capacity utilisation. Jun (1998), in an attempt 
to reach a verdict on these a.lternative explanations, haB confronted the same data 
and spelled-out competing empirica.i hypotheses. His verdict is that market power 
and increasing returns are the main influences on the -cyclica.i- behaviour of the 
Solow residua.!. lodustry and/or economy wide increasing returns, thick market 
externalities, and labour hoarding appear as having second order effects. 
The majority of these papers have to impose some restrictions on the data in 
order to carry-out their empirica.i testing. For instance, unraveling the degree of 
market power usually implies assuming that the latter is coustant over time. By 
the same token, increasing returns have often been identified by assuming tbat 
they are equa.! across industries. Last, the existing empirica.iliterature haB a.lmost 
entirely focused on the cyclical behaviour of the Solow residua.!. To a large extent, 
these assumptions are vaJid in the context of the US: a large, highly competitive 
economy most probably operating at the frontier. This may not necessarily be 
the case for an economy experiencing a regime change. 
This paper presents results obtained with a methodology that, as a first step, 
somewhat departs from standard techniques. The basic idea is that the Spanish 
economy -contrary to the US- haB been subjected to profound structura.l change. 
Perhaps the closest paper, both in terms of methodology and focus, is that of 
Jaurnandreu and Martin (1999), which ana.lyses TFP dynamics in Spain during 
the period 1979-1990. 
To illustrate this point, I first estimate TFP growth using standard techniques 
based on the assumption of perfect competition. The estimates yield results that 
are simply not credible. Not ouly does TFP growth display strong cyclica.i be­
haviour, but the estimate of the trend rate of growth does not make sense. This 
finding is robust to the functiona.! form used, estimation technique, and identify­
ing assumptions. I conjecture that one of the culprits for these awkward results 
is the existence of market power. A cursory glance at accounting margins lends 
support to that hypothesis. 
The second set of results replicates some of the exercises carried out for the 
US economy. The origina.l findings pointing to market power are confirmed using 
three different methodologies that have been used in the empirica.iliterature. The 
latter are well in line with priors on the evolution of the Spanish economy during 
that time period. Notwithstanding, the point estimates ought to be taken with a 
grain of sa.it, as they are based on the assumption of coustant margins (a fact not 
a.lways corroborated by primary data). 
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This paper makes use of an extensive survey of firms carried by the Bank of 
Spain since 1983, gathered in the database Central de Balances. The data col­
lected is comprehensive, each annual sample exceeds four thousand observations, 
and it covers all sectors of economic activity, except for financial institutions. 
Data quality and sample size permit an extensive study of market power and 
TFP dynamics. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is a reminder on growth account­
ing, while section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 presents estimates of TFP 
growth using standard techniques. Section 5 presents the estimates of market 
power at the industry level using a variety of techniques. Section 6 concludes and 
draws some policy implications. 
2. A reminder on growth accounting 
Solow (1957) pioneered the empirica.l study of TFP growth. He identified the 
component of output growth that could not be accounted by variation in input 
quantities. Suppose that the sectoral production function is of the form: 
ei.,F(')i., = Yi" (1) 
where t stands for time and i indexes the unit of observation. The arguments of 
F(.) are the inputs used in production. Mer choosing the appropriate functional 
form and identifying the set of relevant inputs, TFP growth can be approximated 
using (1). 
As an illustration, suppose that (1) is represented by a Cobb-Douglas pro­
duction function, with three inputs: labour, materials and capital. Further, as­
sume that TFP can be modelled in a Hick's neutral way and takes the form 
e,., = Ae"+u;·'+". ii, denotes the rate of productivity growth common to all 
firms, Zi is a time invariant firm specific parameter, and "<.' is assumed to be 
white noise. Expressed in logs and normalised by the capital stock, this y ields: 
In(Y/ K)i" = In(A) +ii,+ai" Io(L/ K)i.' +1i.' Io(M/ K)i" +7), In(K) +z; +Ui.' (2) 
where 7)i represents the local elastIcity of scale minus 1 (assumed to be constant 
over time). Its point estimate indicates the presence (absence) of loca.l returns to 




difference in order to eliminate z,.· Factor shares have been indexed by time; an 
alternative is to consider that they are constant. 
Under perfect competition in product and factor markets, factor shares (Ot, 'Y 
and fJ) are equal to the respective output elasticities (which in turn is equaJ their 
marginal products). If constant returns to scale (CRS) are assumed (1) = 1), then 
capital's share can be obtained as a residual. This implies that if data is available 
on input quantities and factor shares, TFP growth rates can be computed directly. 
If a different functional form is chosen, some parameters may have to be estimated, 
or retrieved from alternative sources. Nonetheless, the basic message remains the 
aame: except when faced with serious data shortages, it is not necessary to have 
recourse to estimation. In principle, if the underlying assumptions of the model 
are correct, the two approaches (direct computation and estimation) should yield 
identical results, save for some measurement error (or random noise). 
The way (2) has been spelt out assumes that TFP grows at a constant rate 
over time. An alternative avenue is the inclusion of annual dummies (the latter is 
less restrictive, but more costly in terms of degrees of freedom). Last, expression 
(2) has been normalised by capital, in line what is usually done in the literature. 
However, it should be noted that the choice of normalisation (an arbitrary choice) 
is not innocuous to the empirical results.! 
When sectoral data is available, TFP growth can be estimated/computed at 
a disaggregated level. It is indeed quite unlikely that alI sectors display the same 
behaviour of TFP growth over time. Formula (2) would bave to be indexed by 
indnstry. 
3. The data 
The data comes directly from the raw files of Central de Balances, a survey carried 
by the Bank of Spain. This annual survey is made up of two questionnaires, one 
for large firms (number of employees greater than 1(0), and a shorter version for 
smaller firms.2 The data used in this paper is to be found in both questionnaires, 
so that the entire sample of responding firms is available. 
1 This may be due to differences in the accuracy with which the variables are measured, 
multicolinearity between the regressors, or more disturbingly, that (3) is not the true model. 
There is no "cure" for these problems, thus the choice of (4). Alternative normalisations (with 
materials or labour) in fact yielded slightly better results. 
2 In addition to the number of employee, there another two financial criteria (on turnover and 
assets). These cut-offs are periodically revised and do not affect sample construction. 
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The original data file contains more than ninety one thousand observations 
(with one observation corresponding to data pertaining to one firm in a given 
year). The data is annual, for the time period 1983-1996. Given sample size, 
it is possible to impose strict filters, aimed at eliminating dubious observations 
(replies), or questionnaires for which some of the essential data is missing. The 
filters that are applied are described in the appendix. The latter are those typicaliy 
used by researchers familiar with Central de Balances (see, for instance, J. Valies 
and I. Hernando (1994)). Some further edition of the data was necessary for the 
exercise carried in this paper. 
The final sample is about half the original size, and consists of 39944 observa­
tions. This panel is unbalanced in the time dimension, given that some firms do 
not report in ali years. Each firm is assigned an anonymous identification number 
specific to the data base. Last, each firm is classified according to its sectoral 
activity. This a.fIiIjation ranges from broad sectors (26 for the whole economy), 
intermediate (82 sectors), to very fine (more than 400 sectors). Subject to the 
number of observations available, it is thus possible to work at very different levels 
of aggregation. 
Both questionnaires provide data on the number of employees. Given the large 
number of short term (or temporary) contracts in Spain, the questionnaires report 
separately the number of employees on long term and short term contracts. Firms 
alao report the average number of weeks that employees on short term contracts 
haw provided during the year. Thus, it is possible to construct the labour input 
in full time equivalents. 
Output is measured as gross output (i.e., including intermediate consump­
tion).' Consumption of intermediate inputs is directly reported in Central de 
Balances. In order to get a precise measure of intermediates' contribution to 
output growth, the relevant variable is net consumption of intermediates. Gross 
purchases would typicaliy overstate the importance of that input, as many firms 
trade or stock parts of their purchases. Net consumption has thus been chosen, 
except for sectors belonging to distribution, where gross consumption of interme­
diates has been chosen instead.' 
'AB shown by HaJJ (1988 p.927) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988, p.56) this is 
a better measure when data on intermediate consumption are available. 
'Given the nature of their activity, the distribution sectors (wholesale and retail) do not re­
port any net purchases, but only gross consumption. These sectors do not carry a direct physical 
production per Be, so that the measurement problem mentioned in the text does not apply in 
their case. Resale of their purchases is their main activity, so that intermediate consumption is 
an appropriate measure of that inputls contribution to output growth. 
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Values for factor shares are computed in the following manner. The labour 
share is obtained as the ratio of total labour costs to gross output, both measured 
in value. Total labour costs are made up of wage costs as well as social security 
contributions, both reported in the survey. Intermediate's elasticity is obtained 
as the value of net intermediate purchases on output. If constant returns to scale 
are assumed, capital's share is then obtained as a residual. Alternatively, output 
elasticities can be econometrically estimated, using (2). In that case, it is possible 
to allow for locally increasing returns to scale. 
As is often the case, construction of the capital stock proved the trickiest 
issue. In the survey, firms report their level of fixed assets, gross investment, and 
depreciation allowance, for each year. In addition, the Bank of Spain computes 
annual fixed capital formation (net of depreciation) for each firm, using the raw 
data. The capital stock was constructed as follows: the level of fixed assets 
reported by the firm in the first year available was taken to be the true value of 
capital stock in that year (see J. Valles and I. Hernando (1994) for a discussion). 
That initial capital stock was then expanded using the series constructed by the 
Bank of Spain. 
It is well known that firms may have distorted incentives (e.g. tax) to report 
the true value of their capital stock, so that the initial estimate may be a biased 
one. In addition, the initial value of the stock is reported using historical costs. 
This is problematic, as it introduces a positive bias in the computation of the 
growth rate of the capital stock. Ceteris paribus, this generates a downward bias 
in TFP estimates. 
Besring this caveat in mind, the estimates obtained make sense. First, the 
survey carried out by the Bank of Spain is extremely detailed (so that cross­
referencing is possible), thus minimising the risk of blunt mis-reporting. Second, 
these surveys are confidential, and not made available to tax authorities. Third, 
it is possible to compute an implicit depreciation rate (and thus expected lifetime 
of an investment). The resulting estimates are quite sensible not only at the 
aggregate level (all sectors, or broad sectors), but also at the disaggregated level. 
On average, depreciation is estimated to be between 5% and 10% per year, well in 
line with what is found in the literature. Moreover, when a closer look is taken at 
the sectoral data, that iuitial impression is confirmed.' Nonetheless, the positive 
5That is, sectoral depreciation rates are in line with priors. For instance, depreciation is 
estimated at 20,2% for business machines (computers), 18,13% for aerospace equipment, and 
11,4% for oomputer services. By contrast, depreciation for railway services stands at 2,6%, that 
of ancillary port and airport services at 2,9%, and that of electricity production �d distribution 
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bias pertaining to the growth rate of the capital remains. Unfortunately, there is 
no way to correct for this bias, save for ad-hoc adjustments. 
All variables have been deflated using aggregate (economy-wide) deflators, 
taken from the BoleUn Estadfstico published by the Bank of Spain. The value­
added deflator has been applied to output, and capital has been deflated using 
the deflator for machinery and equipment. Net purchases of intermediate goods 
has been adjusted using the deflator for intermediate consumption. Finally, the 
capital input has been adjusted by an aggregate indicator of capacity utilisation.' 
4. Base case results: negative TFP growth? 
This section briefly presents the results derived from applying standard techniques 
for computing TFP growth. The results pertain to an 82 sector disaggregation 
of the economy, but carry over to finer or more aggregate measures.7 Results are 
reported for fewer sectors, as for some the number of observations is too small." 
I begin by estimating (2) in levels, separately for each sector. To this end, 
I assume that within sectors, elasticities, returns to scale, and TFP growth are 
equal across firms for the entire time period. Clearly, results are biased in the 
presence of firm level fixed effects (whenever z, .;, 0). Nonetheless, oomparing the 
estimates of (2) in levels and in differences gives an idea of the magnitude of these 
at 4,8%. In between, depreciation for electro-domestic apparatus stands at 7,7%. 
6 Data on electricity consumption by establishment would provide a much more accurate 
indicator of capacity utilisation. Unfortunately, no such data is available. 
7The Bank of Spain aggregates the data for .26 broad sectors (CB 26), and also provides 
the same data for more than 400 sectors, classified according to Spanish national nomenclature 
(ClasificaciOn Naciondl de Actividodes Econ6micas -CNAE/93). The 82 sector breakdown has 
the twin advantage that disaggregation is quite fine, and that for most sectors, the number of 
yearly observations is sufficiently large. 
8 All sectors for which there were less than 35 observations for the entire time period were 
dropped. For the remainder, the number of observations is typically above 200, and ranges in 
the thousands for a few of them. The sectors that have been eliminated are: oil extraction, 
uranium. extraction, extraction of mineral ores, treatment of nuclear fuels, metallurgy, arms 
and munitions, production and distribution of steam, rental of demolition equipment, pipeline 
distribution, postal services, and R&D. These sectors fall in three categories. The first group 
is made of totally marginal activities in Spain (e.g., oil and uranium extraction, armaments 
and munitions, independent R&D labs). The serond is made-up of natural and/or regulated 
monopolies (e.g. pipeline distribution, steam distribution, postal services). Metallurgy stands 
on its own; it is not a state and/or a regulated monopoly, and it is an important sector in Spain. 
For an unknown reason, the raw files of Central de Balances only contain data for 1996; this 
sector had to be dropped for this reason. 
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differences across firms within a sector. Moreover, the presence of firm level fixed 
effects blurs inference on the competitive regime (fixed effects may or may not be 
compatible with the presence of market power). 
Under the hypothesis of perfect competition and homogeneous firms, the right­
hand side variables are exogenous and (2) can be estimated directly. However, 
as I relax this assumption in the next section, I use an instrumental variable ap­
proach to correct for possible endogeneity (and thus have comparable results). 
The instruments used are two period lagged values of the right-hand side vari­
ables." Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) 
proposed covariance matrix. Estimating the growth of TFP (modelled as a time 
trend) does not require an assumption regarding returns to scale; the latter's 
importance is left to be determined by the data!' 
The results are not reported as they are clearly counter-intuitive. In a nutshell, 
TFP growth during the period 198�1996 is found to be negative, or zero, for a 
large number of sectors. Less than 15% of observations belong to sectors which 
experience positive and significant TFP growth, while for the rest it is negative 
-and mostly significant- growth that is the rule. 
When constant returns are assumed, the data permits to retrieve a direct 
measure of TFP levels without having recourse to estimation. These results -
not reported either- are even less satisfactory than the previous ones. Grouping 
these TFP levels by sector, and regressing them on a time trend indicates that, 
apparently, less than 5% of observations belong to sectors that experience positive 
TFP growth. These results are simply not credible. 
To try to make sense of the results, alternative specifications were chosen, such 
as one with only capital and labour as inputs (and using value added instead of 
sales). Different functional forms were also tried, such as a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) or translog (in both cases, the estimation was carried out with 
and without allowing increasing returns).ll The essence of the results remained 
the same. Last, instead of using a time trend (which imposes a specific structure on 
TFP growth), the various specifications mentioned above were tried with annual 
dummies. The same results obtain, that is TFP growth appears to follow a 
9The estimates obtained without instruments are very similar. The precision of the esti­
mation is somewhat higher, as the sample contains all observations. Different lags for the 
instruments were tried, and none of the results changed. 
10 A specification with local returns to scale set equal to zero (Le. 11 = 1) yielded similar 
results. 
11 It should also be noted that using a translog or CES can pose serious econometric problems, 
as some of the quadratic terms are highly oolinear with the non-quadratic regressors. 
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negative trend in far too many cases. When annual dummies are introduced, the 
ones that are significant appear with a negative sign in most cases. 
With the same motivation in mind, I tried to estimate the level of technical 
inefficiency within Spanish industry. Using a stochastic production frontier ap­
proach, I estimated production functions at different levels of aggregation (from 
broad to very fine sectors), using the three functional forms mentioned above. 
The results were systematically unsatisfactory in the sense that the residuals of 
the estimation were not skewed, or worse, positively skewed in almost all cases." 
As mentioned above, the presence of firm level fixed effects will bias the es­
timates obtained from a specification in levels. Thus, I estimated (2) in first 
difference to eliminate fixed effects. Table La summarises the results. The first 
cell of table La provides a headcount of the number of sectors (and the corre­
sponding number of observations) for which TFP growth is found to be negative 
and significant.13 Column 2 provides the number of sectors for which TFP growth 
is negative and not significant, while column 3 gives the same number for positive, 
but imprecisely estimated, coefficients. The last column numbers the sectors for 
which a positive and significant time trend is found. As can be readily seen, the 
picture is still qnite unsatisfactory. 
In only 46.2% of sectors does TFP growth appear to follow a positive trend; for 
the remainder, the sign of the trend is imprecisely estimated, or negative. Apart 
from the estimate of the time trend, the coefficients for these sectoral production 
functions are reasonable, and the adjusted R2 satisfactory." The lower part of 
Table La provides summary information on the estimated coefficients. It reports 
the weighted (by the number of observations) and unweighted average for the 
estimated e1asticities, as well as the average R2 (weighted and unweighted). These 
12Inefficiency is identified from the estimation of the production function (see Caves et al., 
1992 for a presentation). Under the assumption that some inefficiency exist, the residuals will be 
formed of a normally distributed white noise, and a negatively skewed distribution that reflects 
the fact that some firms operate below what is technically optimal. By making an assumption 
on the form of the skewed part of the empirical distribution (e.g. half normal or exponential), 
it is possible to obtain an estimate of technical inefficiency from the residuals' third moments. 
A positive skew indicates that there is a small group of very efficient firms, but that the bulk 
are technically inefficient. This finding is hard to reconcile with the assumption of perfect 
competition. Unraveling the true level of inefficiency in Spanish industry is the topic of another 
paper. 
131 also looked at the proportion of output or employment that each of these cells represent 
(e.g. share of total employment belonging to se�rs which experience negative TFP growth). 
The picture is very similar to the one described in the text. 
14The full set of results is available from me upon request. 
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results pertain to significant estimates; the percentage indicates what proportion 
of the total sample these oheervations represent. 
As can be seen, the point estimate of 1/ is often quite large and significantly 
negative (indicating strong decreasing returns to scale at the sectoral level). Sus­
picious of this result, I re-estimated (2) -in differences- setting 1/ = O. The results, 
summarised in Table.1. b, confirm the initial finding: TFP growth is found to be 
negative in far too many cases. While the estimates of the elasticities are more in 
line with priors than those reported in Table La, the proportion of sectors which 
experience significant and positive TFP growth falls to a paltry 9.2%. 
These results are at best puzzling. First, negative or zero TFP growth is 
highly unlikely in any economy during a time period of fourteen yea",." Second, 
the time period under consideration is considered to be one of fast technological 
progress in the Spanish economy, not one of stagnation or decline. Moreover, these 
awkward results are corroborated by an analysis of technical inefficiency. Last, 
the important differences between estimates in levels and those in differences are 
indicative of the presence of significant fixed effects. As mentioned earlier, fixed 
effects may result from the existence of market power. The next paragraphs 
discuss possible causes that could account for these peculiar results. 
With firm level data mixing nominal and real variables, biases due to the ab­
sence of hedonic adjustment will be present. In other words, the nominal value 
of output may underestimate its true economic value, as many quality improve­
ments will not be reflected in prices." Unfortunately, given the data available, 
it is not possible to adjust the variables for quality changes. The remainder of 
the analysis proceeds without controlling for hedonic adjustment; this is due to 
data limitation, not to a belief that this has not been an important phenomenon 
during the period under consideration. 
Thus far, the standard Cobb-Donglas cum perfect competition description of 
the economy has been assumed. Clearly, if the firms in the sample do not operate 
under perfect competition, the TFP estimations presented above are unreliable. 
For one, factor shares may not approximate true output elasticities. The remain­
der of the paper focuses on identifying the degree to which firms are able to price 
above marginal cost. 
16That is, an economy functioning under "normal" conditions, i.e. nat subjected to a drastic 
negative shock,· such as a war or a change in the soci.,political system. 
HI To my knowledge, the only statistical office that intents to adjust for quality changes in a 
transparent and consistent manner is the US Bureau of Labour Statistics. See Moulton and 
Roses (1997) for a discussion. Regarding durable goode, the classic reference is Gordon (1990). 
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5. Accounting for the degree of market power 
5.1. Existing evidence 
Industrial organisation theorists have developed a wide variety of models in which 
firms interact strategically in an oligopolistic context. Even with homogeneous 
products, these models imply firms will price above marginal cost, except in the 
polar case of a one-shot Bertrand game with unlimited capacity in the short­
run. Moreover, simple models of product differentiation involve a departure from 
the assumptions of perfect competition, as firms can exercise market power on 
their market segment. Most empirical studies of specific industries (or group 
thereof) has found evidence of substantial market power.17 The increasing levels 
of industry concentration in developed economies do suggest that market power is 
a pervasive phenomenon (Clarke 1985). Casual observation of the workload faced 
by the US Federal Trade Commission, European national competition authorities, 
and Directorate General IV of the European Commission indicate that the exercise 
of market power is widespread. 
From our perspective, the most relevant work are the pioneering contributions 
of Robert Hall (1986, 1988) and Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) -DHP 
thereafter. Hall (1986, 1988) convincingly showed that industries do not operate 
under perfect competition as they establish prices above marginal (or average 
variable) cost. Thus, estimates of TFP growth that do not adjust for market 
power will be biased. Using a more extensive and detailed dataset, DHP (1988) 
provide robust and significant evidence pertaining the existence of market power. 
A number of papers have confirmed these initial findings (see Hall (1990) and 
Botasso and Sembenelli (1999)). More generally, there is an important empirical 
literature that studies the evolution and determinants of price-cost margins (see 
for instance DHP (1986), Petersen and Katic 1994, Jacquemin and Sapir (1991)). 
Hall's and DHP's work pertain to the US, which is considered as the most 
competitive economy in the world. A priori, economies that aXe less competitive 
than the US are more likely to be subjected to the exercise of market power. 
From that perspective, Spain is an ideal subject of study (see section 5.8 below). 
At the beginning of the period under consideration, 1983, it was an economy just 
emerging from decades of corporatist/statist economic management. By the end of 
the time period, 1996, Spain was fully integrated in the EU, and eventually made 
it into the first group of participants to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
"See Bresnahan (1989) for a survey. 
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This preliminary evidence suggests that important changes in market structure 
occurred during that period. Spain presents the twin advantage of a presumption 
of substantial market power at the beginning of the period, and changes in it 
thereafter. Using a different data set, Jaumandreu and Martin (1999) provide 
convincing evidence pointing in that direction. 
5.2. Assessing the degree of market power 
Hall ((1986), (1988), (1990)) uses the invariance properties of the Solow residual 
to assess the degree of market power. The key insight is that, once there is 
a departure from perfect competition, firms charge prices above marginal cost. 
This implies that when output expands, total revenues increase faster than total 
costs. In the words ofDHP (1988 p. 56), the consequence is that: "if price exceeds 
marginal cost, then the labor share in cost aL is equal to (plc)aL' where aL is 
defined with respect to the value of output (PQ)". Given that firms minimise 
costs irrespective of the competitive regime, it is possible to retrieve an estimate 
of the price to marginal cost ratio. To do so, it is necessary to assume that factor 
markets are competitive. 
Hall's ((1988) p. 926) estimation is based on the following expression: 
t:J.q - at:J.n - "(t:J.m = (JJ. - l)(at:J.n + "(t:J.m) + tJ (3) 
where q is the log of gross output to capital, n the log of the ratio of labour to 
capital, and m is the log of the materials to capital ratio. a and "( are, respectively, 
the factor shares of labour and materials in the value of gross output" tJ is the 
rate of Hicks neutral technological progress and JJ. is the ratio of price to marginal 
cost (PIc). The way (3) is written implies constant returns to scale.IS Estimates 
of JJ. obtained using (3) are referred as "Hall" in the tables reporting the results. 
Hall (1988) does not estimate (3) directly as his data does not contain materi­
als. Rather, he regresses the Solow residual (computed with value-added) on a set 
of instruments uncorrelated with technological progress (tJ), but correlated with 
inputs and output." Only under the assumption of perfect competition (JJ. = 1) 
18When I turn to estimation, output, shares, and inputs are indexed by time and unit of 
observation, just as in (4) and (5) below. Equation (3) is spelled out the way it appears in 
Hall's (1986) original paper. 
19The presence (absence) of returns to scale baa key implications for the interpretation of the 
results. This issue is examined in section 5.7. 
20Tbe instruments used are military spending, the political party of the US president, and oil 
prices. 
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is this correJation equal to zero. Note that this is an indirect method of assessing 
the effect of market power. His results pertain to a two-digit level of aggregation. 
DHP (1988) make use of a different data set that contains information on gross 
output and materials. Their estimates of price cost margins is thus corrected for 
materials." In addition, the level of aggregation is much finer. Using Hall's 
framework, and assuming that material consumption varies in strict proportion 
to output, they estimate the following equation: 
Aq;" - <>i"A"", - "Y",Am;" = 19,(1 - 8) + 8Aq", + (1 - 8)A"", (4) 
where i indexes the industry, 19, is the trend rate of TFP growth, "',' is the log 
of a productivity shock, and 8 is the Lerner index, that is (p - clip. Using (4) 
and correcting for endogeneity (Aq;" appears on both sides), DHP (1988) are able 
to estimate price-cost margins directly. Estimates of the latter will be referred as 
"DHP". 
These exercises share the following characteristics. First, both sets of authors 
assume coustant returns to scale." Second, price-cost margins are assumed to 
remain stable over time. Third, factor markets are assumed to be competitive, an 
assumption that I also maintain. 
Last, Botasso and Sembenelli (1999) extend Hall's framework by including 
materials and allowing for variable returns to scale. The equation, they estimate 
is based on: 
Aq", = Ad", + 1-'",(a",A"", + "Y",Am;, ) + TJAk;" + Au;" (5) 
where k;" is the log of the capital stock. Estimates of I-' from (5) will be 
referred as "BS". 
The formulations of (3), (4), and (5) exploit the fact that in the presence 
of market power, a factor's share in costs is equal to its share in gross output 
times the price to marginal cost ratio. As shown by Konings, Van Cayseele and 
Warzynski (1999), it is possible to give a structural interpretation to (3), (4), and 
(5). These equations are extensions of the structural framework developed by 
Levinsohn (1993), which introduces conjectural variations in a model of oligopoly. 
21 They show that if output varies in strict proportion to materials (a fact clearly corroborated 
by empirical evidence -see Basu (1996)), the true markup (6) is equal to ova(l - f), where Ova 
is the estimate of the markup using value added, and i the share of materials. 
22Hall (1990) relaxes this assumption by obtaining a direct measure of the cost of capital. 
Given the data available for Spain, I amId Dot follow that additional route. 
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The remainder of the paper focuses on these three equations. In addition, given 
the data available, I can directly compute price-cost margins without resorting to 
estimation. In that way, I am able to check for the consistency and robustness of 
the results by comparing my estimates with an accounting measure of price-cost 
margins.23 
5.3. Computing price cost margins 
To get an accounting estimate of price cost margins, I adopt the methodology 
proposed by Do=owitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986). Price cost margins are 
defined as:" 
p - c Value of sales + C!. inventories - payroll - cost of materials 
-- =  
p Value of sales + C!. inventories (6.1) 
Where C!. stands for "changes in" . The inclusion of inventory changes ensures 
that adjustment for business cycle fluctuations are catered for in our measure 
of price cost margins." According to the accounting definitions adopted in the 
Central de Balances survey, this is equivalent to: 
p - c 
=
 
Value added - payroll 
p Value added + net cost of materials (6.2) 
The latter are referred to as "PCM" in the tables. An alternative expression 
is the price to marginal cost ratio: 
23 As will become clear in the next section, the data contains sufficient information to estimate 
TFP growth after having adjusted the data to take market power into account. However, I was 
unable to find good instruments to correct for endogeneitYi this resulted in imprecisely estimated 
coefficients. 
24 Expression 6.1 looks very similar to the share of capital in revenue. This should oome as no 
surprise, as profits in excess of the normal rate of return will be reflected in the share of capital. 
It may also be the case that excess returns are appropriated by factors of production other 
than capital. This will occur whenever costs are endogenous, reflecting a bargaining process 
between the parties involved. Throughout, 1 maintain the assumption that factor markets are 
competitive, Le. rents or quasi-rents accrue to capital only. The distribution of rents between 
factors of production is the topic of another paper. 
25It is often the case that researchers assume that the value of sales is equal to the value of 
output. This is unlikely to be the case if business fluctuations lead to important changes in 
inventories. 
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� = 1/(1 _ P - c) c p (6.3) 
This formula provides an annual accounting estimate of the price-marginal 
cost ratio for each firm. 
Note there is no a priori reason to think that changes in the degree of market 
power have heen homogeneous across sectors. In some cases, market power may 
have remahied stahle, or increased, over the time period. Before proceeding with 
the analysis, it is useful to briefly examine the behaviour of price-cost margins 
during the period under consideration. Table 2.a provides summary information 
on price cost margins for the sectors present in the sample. 
It is interesting to note that for almost all sectors, the mean of price-cost 
margins is grester than the median, an indication that some firms enjoy a greater 
ability to price above marginal cost. This is confirmed by a cursory glance at 
skewness. 
Regressing price-cost margins on a time trend and GDP growth reveals that 
price-cost margins have fallen in some sectors, but no clear tendency can be de­
tected over the time period. This finding confirms my prior that the degree of 
structural change has heen important during that period. What is more, this 
trend is far from homogeneous across sectors. A similar picture emerges from 
their cyclical behaviour. Overall, pric&cost margins appear as pro-cyclical, but 
there are marked differences across sectors. Table 2. b summarises the information 
pertaiIllng to the trend and cyclical evolution of price-cost margins at the sectoral 
level.26 
5.4. Estimating the degree of market power 
In this section, I directly estimate (3), (4) and (5). To do this, I have to assume 
that, within sectors, the price to marginal cost ratio is constant through time 
and identical across firms. The first two equations assume constant returns to 
scale, while (5) allows for variable returns and in this sense, it is a more general 
formulation. However, interpretation for the returns to scale parameter remains 
problematic in view of the capital stock data. 
In order to estimate the price to marginal cost ratio, I pr&multiply input 
quantities by -time-varying- factor shares." Note however that estimation of 
26The tables just gives a hea.dcount of sectorsj the entire set of results is available from me. 
27 A ThOnqvist (1936) approximation bas been used for the change in factor shares. See 
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these three equations will yield precise and unbiased estimates only if margins are 
roughly constant over time. Table 2.b indicates that this may not always be the 
case. 
When firms enjoy market power, output prioes are no longer exogenous to 
the model. To address the issue of endogeneity, an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach has been adopted. I use the same instruments as DHP (1988), that is 
current and lagged GDP growth. These authors defend the use of these instru­
ments by arguing that real-business-cycle technology shocks are absent from the 
economy." If this condition holds and no sector is large enough to influence the 
economy-wide rate of growth (which is the case for my sample), then GDP growth 
ought to be correlated with input and output changes, but not with TFP growth. 
In order to maintain consistency across procedures, I used the same instruments 
in the estimation of (3), (4), and (5). 
A superior prooedure involves the use of the generalised method of moments 
(GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This approach fully exploits all 
orthogonality conditions (Le., two-stage least squares -TSLS- are a special case 
of GMMs), and easily allows for a general mispecification. test. The drawback 
is that a large number of consecutive observations is necessary to obtain precise 
estimates, thus greatly reducing sample size. Therefore, to check the consistency of 
the resnlts obtained using TSLS, I applied GMM at a higher level of aggregation 
{in order to have sufficient observations)." The instruments used are three to 
five period lags of the independent variables. This procedure also permits the 
introduction of annual dummies, which yield a better estimate of TFP growth. 
For strict comparability purposes, I also r.,.ran the same estimation using the 
instruments applied to the TSLS estimation, namely current and lagged measures 
aggregate GDP growth. The disadvantage is that I am no longer able to introduce 
annual dummies to retrieve TFP growth, as this instrument is the same for all 
observations for a given year. 
Diewert (1976) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for a discussion of this approximation. This 
is in line with the exercises reviewed in this paper. Imposing constancy of shares yields similar 
results to those reported below. 
280ne may disagree with this viewj I stick to the same specification for strict comparison 
purposes. DHP (1988) provide evidence in support of the view that aggregate technology shocks 
are absent. HaJJ (1986) also adopts this stance. 
29For sectors that contain enough observations, I applied GMMs at the same level of aggrl7 
gation. The results are very similar. 
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5.5. TSLS estimates 
Estimating each of these three equations allows me to check broad consistency 
of the results using different methodologies. Furthermore, I can directly compare 
the margins constructed using the raw data from Central de Balance.s (given by 
(6.2)) and those retrieved from the estimation of (4).30 Given that the relation­
ship between the price to marginal cost ratio and price-cost margins is not linear, 
transforming the former into the latter for comparison purposes can be problem­
atic. For instance, this will be the case whenever the means of two series are 
different. In this case, comparisons can only be made using simple rank corre­
lations. However, the raw correlation between estimates of ", in (3) and (5) on 
the one hand (untransformed), and 6 in (4) and accounting margins on the other, 
should be positive. 
Table 3 summarises the results; an empty cell means that the estimate was not 
significant at the 15% level.3l AB can be readily seen, I did not obtain significant 
estimates for a number of sectors. Apart from the small number of observations 
for some sectors, the imprecise estimates are probably due to the difficulty of 
finding good instruments and the fact that price-cost margins are not constant 
over this time period for a good few sectors. 
The first column reports the estimates using Hall's original methodology, but 
inclusive of materials (i.e., eq. (3) indexed accordingly). The estimated price to 
marginal cost ratio is, on average, qulte high (the latter is obtained by adding 1 
to the point estimate of '" - 1 obtained from (3)). High estimates obtained from 
(3) have been reported in the literature, and should come as no surprise. 
I then estimated (5), which is equlvalent to (3), save that it allows for variable 
returns to scale. From this equation, I obtain a direct estimate of the price 
to marginal cost ratio, ",. Stricto sensu, this variable ought to be significantly 
superior to one in the presence of market power. The latter condition is not 
fulfilled for some sectors. The results that are reported are for sectors for which 
the point estimate was found to be significantly different from zero, and greater 
or equal to one." Apart from the presence of the scale parameter, this selection 
30Fer accounting margins, I use the average over the entire period for each sector. 
3IThe use of instruments means that standard errors easily become very large. Thus, 1 chose 
15% as the cut·ofl significance levels. This marginally expands the set of estimates deemed to 
be significant. 
32There is an intrinsic problem associated with the estimation of the price to marginal coot 
ratio, particularly when instruments have to be used. An economically acceptable value of the 
price to marginal cost ratio ought to be equal or greater than one, but not take excessively 
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rule explains why I get a larger number of estimates using (5) rather than (3). 
A simple average of these estimated price to marginal cost ratios across sectors 
gives a mean value of 1.47, and when each sector is weighted by the number 
of observations it contains, the value falls to 1.37. Botb are reasonable values, 
particularly the second one. Overall, estimates of (4) ought to be taken with a 
grain of aa1t, as some of the point estimates are not significantly different from 
one. 
'Thrning to eq. (5), most of the estimates of the Lerner index are significantly 
different from zero, which means that the hypothesis of perfect competition is 
rejected. Overall, DHP's (1998) method yields the largest number of significant 
estimates, and the fit of the equation (F statistic) is by far superior. In addi­
tion, the point estimates are, for most sectors, more reasonable in the sense that 
estimated margins are within acceptable values. 
I also examined the correlation between the series, and computed simple as well 
as rank correlations between pairs of estimates. The results are presented in Table 
4; the first entry in each cell reports the simple correlation, the second, the rank 
correlation, and the third, the number of sectors for which the different method­
ologies yielded significant results. The correlations are computed for the sectors 
which form the intersection of significant estimates between pairs of methodolo­
gies. As can be readily seen in Table 4, both the simple and rank correlations 
between each pair of estimates are quite high. This table also reports correlations 
between estimated and accounting margins (denoted PCM). The previous result 
of high correlations carries over to that exercise as well.33 
5.6. GMM estimates 
I then estimated margins by applying the GMM procedure.34 The results pertain 
to a higher level of aggregation (26 sectors for the entire economy), as I need a 
larger number of observations for each sector. Table 5 reports four sets of results 
obtained from estimating (3) and (4). Results pertaining to estimates (5) are not 
reported for two reasons. First, the results are very similar to those pertaining to 
the estimate of (3). Second, results pointed to strong decreasing returns at the 
high values, as this would imply very high pure profits. The difficulty lies in the fact in the 
absence of very good instruments, it is difficult to obtain very precise estimates. The end result 
is that equality to one cannot be rejected. at standard significance levels for a two tailed test, 
eventhough the point estimate appears as reasonable. 
33DHP (1988) carry out the same exercisej the results are qualitatively similar. 
34For this exercise, I used. DPD, a free software developed by Arellano and Bond. 
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sectoral level, which rendered the results of dubious value. In addition, estimates 
of (5) quite often failed tbe standard econometric tests associated with a GMM 
procedure. 
For both (3) and (4), I applied GMMs using the same instruments as those per­
taining to the simple TSLS procedure, that is current and lagged GDP growth." 
Using current and lagged GDP growth does not permit the introduction of time 
dummies, and is reported simply for comparison purposes (the results are labelled 
''IV"). The second set of results (denoted "GMM") are obtained by using three, 
four, and five period lags of the regressor. This permits the introduction of time 
dummies to approximate TFP growth annually. This latter set of results, reported 
in Table 5, is superior from an econometri� perspective, but can only be obtained 
after having aggregated the data. 
These results confirm the earlier findings of pricing above marginal cost. How­
ever, in a number of respects, they represent a marked improvement over previous 
estimates. First, the coefficient measuring market power is estimated very pre­
cisely (most estimates of (4) are significant at the 0.0l% levels). Second, the 
magnitudes are more reasonable in sectors for which the degree of market power 
was found to be very high using simple TSLS.36 Third, almost alI sectoral esti­
mations safely pass the rather stringent statistical tests associated with GMMs 
(Wald, Sargan, and 1st and 2nd order autocorrelations).37 Fourth, the time dum­
mies (not reported in the Table) point to a significant slowdown in TFP growth 
during the second half of the time period. This result is in line with other find­
ings regarding the reduction of catch-up opportunities in Spanish economy (de la 
FUente 1995), and is corroborated by another study using micro data (Jaumandreu 
and Martin (1999)). 
35 Given the suspicious value taken by the point estimate of 11 in previous exercises, the results 
pertain to a specification with 11 = O. 
36For instance, the estimates found for coke and lignite extraction applying (4) and using 
simple TSLS yielded price cost margins of 1.077, which implies negative costs (though this 
estimate is not significantly different from 1). Given the amount of subsidies this sector receives, 
this may not be so implausible. Nevertheless, the GMM estimates yield a more reasonable 
estimate (which stands below one). As a general rule, all GMM estimates are more in line with 
priors on sectoral margins. 
37It is interesting to note that the "worst" estimations from the perspective of statistical tests 
are also the ones that yield point estimates that are very high. 
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5.7. Returns to scale 
The nature of returns to scale has important implications for the interpretation of 
the results. The following simple relationship holds in equilibrium (Basu 1996): 
P P P AC 1 
C = MC = AC MC = 1 _ rrRI'S (7) 
Where AC denotes average cost, rr the pure profit rate and RI'S the degree 
of returns to scale. This formula implies that positive margins coupled with 
decreasing returns give rise to pure profits. In the estimation using differenoes, 
I found strong evidence of decreasing returns (see Table 1). Combined with the 
-significant- estimates on margins, this would imply huge pure profits, of the order 
of 40% or more for many sectors. As in the case of TFP estimates, these results 
are simply not credible. The culprit is most likely due to the estimation of the 
capital stock. Overestimation of the latter's growth rate results in a negative bias 
both in the estimation of TFP and of returns to scale. 
While there is no obvious solution to this measurement problem, it is nonethe­
less possible to retrieve reasonable estimates of returns to scale. Indeed, estimation 
of (2) in levels somewhat alleviates the problem of mismeasurement;38 the draw­
back is that firm-level fixed effects are not controlled for. Despite this caveat, the 
point estimates obtained using levels make sense. For most sectors, I find evi­
dence of slight increasing returns to scale, though in most cases, it is not possible 
to reject the hypothesis of constant returns. The average for the entire sample 
is 2.7%; which is much more reasonable than the value of -0.32% obtained using 
differences. While estimates in levels are credible, the bias associated with the 
measurement of capital remains. Thus, these values ought to be interpreted as a 
lower bound for the true degree of returns to scale. 
As pointed by Basu (1996), positive margins require increasing returns for pure 
profits to remain within acceptable ranges. Increasing returns are present if there 
are some sort of fixed costs associated with starting operations. This condition 
holds in most, if not all, sectors of economic activity. Thus, the picture that 
emerges from this data is one of increasing returns coupled with positive margins, 
which yield important pure profits in some sectors. Overall, the implied level of 
pure profits remain within credible magnitudes for most sectors.39 
38 Estimates in levels display more "inertia"; this makes easier to unravel the relationship 
between output and capital growth. 
39ln the case of the US, pure profits in the 4-6% are typically reported. It thus not surprising 




The simple and rank correlations between pure profits obtained with the es­
timates of returns to scale from (2), price cost ratios from estimates of (3), (4), 
and (5), and using (7), is very high (the lowest value is 0.87). A similar picture 
emerges if the same exercise is carried out with accounting estimates of pure prof­
its (using (2) and (6.3)). The low ... t value of these simple correlations between 
pairs of pure profits is 0.31. Table 6 summarises these results. 
5.8. Competition conditions in Spain and the impact of EU entry 
This section provides a summary overview of Spain's economy. The basic ar­
gument is that there is pervasive evidence indicating that degree and nature of 
competition changed during that time period. In 1983, Spain was emerging form 
its political transition, and with it, the previous statist/corporatist economic sys­
tem was being progressively dismantled. The exercise of labour's rights put many 
firms under strain.'· By 1986, Spain had signed its accession agreement with 
the Ee. Spanish entry coincided with the most important liberalisation exer­
cise in Europe since the 1960's, namely the implementation of the single market 
programme. A foreign direct investment boom during the late 1980's increased 
domestic competition to a degree hitherto unknown. As a result of its acces­
sion, Spain adopted the acquis communautaire, which resulted in the opening of 
many sectors of economic activity." A competition tribunal was set-up in 1989 
to apply the legislation adopted to protect competitive conditions in the domestic 
market." As an example of anecdotal evidence pertaining to competitive condi­
tions, domestic distribution systems were overhauled following the wave of FDI. 
To sum-up, Spain was subjected to a sharp increase in the degree of competition. 
In the absence of entry and exit, and all else equal, this ought to have resulted 
in a fall in average margins.·3 As shown in section 5.3, there is some evidence 
40 Until the late 1970's, many firms had survived because labour rosts had. been kept down 
by suppressing 'WOrkers rights. Once the right to free trade unions were recognised, many firms 
went bust because they could not operate profitably with higher labour costs. 
41 As an example, Spain had. to adapt its system of intellectual protection. Till then, Spanish 
pharmaceutical products could not be sold on the European market, as the country was not 
offering adequate intellectual property rights protection (IPR). As a result of adopting an ade­
quate IPR framework, foreign investment boomed in the pharmaceutical sector. This resulted 
in a drastic increase in competition in that sector. 
42 Current oompetition in Spain is modelled on the relevant articles of the Treaty of Rome and 
the related secondary legislation. In short, Spanish competition law applies European rules to 
domestic competition cases. 
43 A fairly general formulation to identify firms ability to price above marginal cost is given 
- 27 -
pointing in that direction (for some sectors, regressing margins on a time trend 
yields a significantly negative estimate). 
Of course, unraveling the true relationship between margins' dynamics and 
competitive pressure require that consideration be given to entry and exit. An 
increase of competition is compatible with stable (or slightly falling margins), if 
the reductions in prices are matched by changes in the composition of firms within 
the industry. Under this scenario, inefficient firms exit while new entrants ought 
to be characterised by a higher level of efficiency. Exit may occur even margins 
remain positive, as they may be too low to cover fixed costs. 
Unfortunately, Central de Balances does not allow for a proper treatment of 
entry and exit processes. At best, it is possible to have a first approximation of true 
entry and exit by constructing proxies for these two variables." In order to gain an 
idea of how these proxies behaved with respect to accounting margins (obtained 
using 6.2), I looked at yearly margin aVerages for different groups of firms "  
Focusing on yearly averages ensures that inference is not driven by aggregate 
cyclical fluctuations. Due to space limitations, I only report results for averages 
for the entire sample; sectoral averages yield very similar results. 
Apart from 1989, a clear cut pattern emerges from the results. Systematically, 
margins are lower for firms that have been defined as "exiters" . By contrast, 
"entrants" generally enjoy higher margins. Moreover, "entrants" that do not exit 
enjoy higher margins than thooe that will eventually "exit" .46 This pattern is the 
p - c 1 
-p- = h. + "  h. .�'" 1:- ,) lip" Pi 
where h denotes product i' 8 elasticity of demand and �J the cross price elasticity. The market 
structure underpinning this equation is one of n firms each producing a single differentiated 
product, itself an imperfect substitute for the other goods produced in the industry. With 
unchanged consumer preferences, the effect of increased competition (both from domestic and 
foreign sources) would work its way through the denominators' seoond term. See Neven, Nuttal 
and Seabright (1993) for a oomprehensive <liseussion. 
-'4 I have defined "entry" as the first year in which a firm appears in the database. A fum 
is deemed to have "exited" if it does not report in any of the last three years of the sample. 
Clearly, the sample is censored on both sides, and both measures of entry and exit contain 
biases. Nonetheless, these definitions, which definitely contain an ad-hoc element, are probably 
acceptable first approximations. 
4:iSee Jaumandreu and Martin (1999) for a fuller treatment of entry and exit in Spanish 
industry during the period 1975-1990. 
46 In order to rationalise "entry" followed by "exit", one has to appeal to concepts of trembling 
hand equilibria, or to a particularly negative realisation of nature for these firms. Of course, these 
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one expected in a situation where competitive pressure becomes sharper, while 
at the same time, average margins are stable or falling slightly. This is due to 
the fact that, as a result of greater competition, efficiency differences across firms 
inerease as a result of entry and exit. 
These results seem to corroborate a claim often made by scholars of economic 
integration, namely that the main effect of integration is to sharpen competi­
tive conditions (CEPR 1992). Empirical studies which evaluated the effect of 
integration typically found that the latter is small (Smith and Venables (1987)). 
However, these comparative statics exercises (often consisting of calibration) can­
not capture the pro-competitive impact related to integration. A few papers have 
analysed the issue in a dynamic setting, but the focus has been on aggregate in­
vestment and TFP growth (investment is positively affected, while no clear effect 
is detected on TFP). As argued by Felipe and McCombie (1998) aggregate series 
mimic a well behaved Cobb-Douglas with no market power, and it is therefore 
not possible to unravel to effect of integration on competition conditions. The 
findings reported in this paper suggest that economic integration does have a 
stroug pro-competitive effect (see also Jaumandreu and Martin (1999) for similar 
evidence pertaining to the late 1980's). 
6. Conclusion 
This paper was begun with the modest objective of estimating sectoral TFP 
growth at a fine level of disaggregation for the Spanish economy. Standard tech­
niques, based on the assumption of perfect competition, systematically yielded 
poor results. To try to make sense of the results, I identified the degree of market 
power at the sectoral level. The bottom line conclusion of these exercises is that 
there is evidenoe of pricing above marginal cost. 
Nevertheless, data on accounting margins indicate that some Spanish firms 
have been subjected to an increase in competitive pressure, probably as a result 
of EU entry. Unfortunately, the lack of accurate data on entry and exit processes 
does not permit formal testing of that conjecture. However, using proxies for 
entry and exit does suggest that less efficient firms have been replaced by more 
productive entrants. This pattern is consistent with an inerease in competition 
coupled with stable or slightly falling margins. 
firms could be true entrants that do not exit, but simply fail to fill in the Central questionnaire 
at the end of the sample period. 
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Last, this paper has only addressed the "puzzle" generated by micro data 
TFP estimates based on the assumption of perfect competition. There remains 
the task of better understanding the finn-level determinants of TFP growth and 
its relationship with market power. For instance, the latter has probably been 
affected by the presence of foreign firms in the Spanish economy. By the same 
token, estimates of technical (in)efficiency conld be retrieved once changes in 
market power are catered for. Also, changes in the degree of competition ought 
to generate important changes in market structure -in the presenoe of sunk costs, 
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Appendix 
The data was filtered in order to systematically eliminate observations of du­
bious value. 
Labour input: firms reporting non poeitive values for this variable were dropped. 
Value added and gross output: firms reporting non-poeitive values for either 
of these variables were eliminated. 
Firms reporting total labour costs greater than value added, inclusive of sub­
sidies, were dropped. 
Firms which reported gross fixed capital formation data which implied an 
expected life time of the investment greater than sixty years, or less than three 
years, were dropped from the sample. 
Firms whose payments to suppliers of inputs and total labour costs were 
greater than the value of gr08S output were dropped from the sample. 
Firms for which some of the data necessary to construct at least one of the 
variables were dropped from the sample. 
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Table 1.a: Estimation of (2) in first differences. Upper part: distribution of sectors according to TFP 
estimates. Lower part: weighted and unweighted average across sectors of the significant point 
estimates of the coefficients (weighted by the number of observations the sector represents). The 
adjusted R2 to the average across all sectors. Cut-off significance level chosen: 10%. Robust estimates 
obtained using White's (1980) covariance matrix. Sectors with less than 35 observations were 
dropped. 82 sectors breakdown of the economy. 
Negative & Negative & not Positive & not Positive & 
significant significant significant signitlcant 
% of sectors (No. In 1.5% 1 5 .4% 36.9% 46.2% 
parenthesis). (I) ( 10) (24) (30) 
% ofobs. (No. In 0.9% 2 1 .0% 29.7% 48.3% 
parenthesis) (292) (6469) (91 48) (14844) 
CO< Y n e R' 
Simple average 0.394 0.240 -0.358 0.022 0.748 
Weighted average 0.439 0.205 -0.317 0.016 0.786 
%Sectors 92.3% 83.1% 93.8% 53.8% 100% 
%Observations 98.6% 96.0% 98.5% 52.7% 100% 
Table 1.b: As above, save for the setting of 11=0. 
Negative & Negative & not Positive & not Positive & 
significant significant significant significant 
% of sectors (No. In 12.3% 38.5% 40.0% 9.2% 
I parenthesis) (8) (25) (26) (6) 
% of obs. (No. In 25.6% 38.5% 27.7% 8.1% I parenthesis) (7869) (1185 1 )  (8532) ('501) 
CO< Y e R
' 
Simple avera�e 0.409 0.434 0.000 0.755 
Weighted average 0.370 0.484 -0.006 0.702 
%Sectors 98.5% 92.3% 24.6% 100% 
%Observations 99.8% 98.3% 36.7% 100% 
Total number of sectors: 65 
Total number of observations: 30753 
- 36 -
Table 2.a: Second and third row: quintile distribution of the mean of price cost margins -denoted M· 
for sectors (each quintile represents 14 sectors). Fourth and fifth rows: quintile distribution of 
skewness by sectors. 
lSl auintile 2n1 ouintile 311 quintile 41' quintile SIn quintile 
0.039<M<0.132 O.136<M<O.149 O .150<M<O.179 O .1 84SM$O.249 O.250<M<O.499 
Skewness(S) Skewnes; (S) Skewness (S) Skewness (S) Skewn�ss (S) 
-O.467<S<O.397 0.492<S$O.880 O.889<S<1.l67 1 . 1 86<S<1.505 1 .646<S<3.753 
Total number of sectors: 70 
Total number of observations: 39944 
Table 2.b: Evolution over time of price·cost margins and their cyclical behaviour. The ·first two 
rows refer to the point estimate for the time trend, while the next two p�rtain to that of GOP growth. 
Cut·offsignificance level: 10%. 
Negative & Negative & not Positive & not ; Positive & 
significant significant significant significant 
% of sectors (No. in 2 1 .7% 33.3% 24.6% 20.3% 
oarenthesis) ( 1 5 )  (23) ( 1 7) (14) 
% of obs. (No. in 44.6% 24.6% !t 1 %  14.7% I oarenthesi�) (I  7794) (9829) 6424) (5875) 
. -� Negative & Negative & not Positive & not Positive 
si�""uificant s
·
l�nificant sirmificant siQnificant 
% of sectors (No. in 7.2% 36.2% 37.7% 18.8% I parenthesis) (5) (25) (26) (I3)  
% of obs. (No. m 8.9% 23.3% /9.3% 38.4% l oarenthesis) (3566) (9301) 1 1 7 1 3 )  i1 5342) 
Total number of sectors: 69 
Total number of observations: 39922 
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Table 3: Margin estimates using TSLS, 82 sectors breakdown of the economy 
SECTOR DESCR[PTION BS HALL DHP PCM 
[ Coke and lignite extraction [ ,077 0,275 
5 Non energetic nor metallic are extraction 3,353 0,7[4 0,334 
7 Fish based products [ , 1 l 3  0,[ 7 [  0,095 
9 Beverages [,416 1,416 0.294 0,184 
[4 Basic chemicals [,369 1 .379 0,275 0,178 
16 Other chemical industries [ , [ 58 [,217 0,[86 0,147 
1 7  Glass products 0,679' 0,186 
19 Other non metallic mineral products 4,042 0,762 0,219 
21  Metal products (except mach and eQPt) 1,147 1,219 0,189 0,145 
22 General use machinery 1,495 0,368 0.145 
23 Industrial and agricultural machinery 1 ,069 0, 1 42 
25 Domestic equipment 1,221 0,132 
27 Electrical machinery and equipment 1 ,302 1 ,270 0,21 5  0,137 
28 Electronic eql:li2ment and material 1,291 0,149 
29 Medical-surgical. optical and 1,471 O,i48 
watchmaking equipment and instruments 
30 Motor vehicles 1 ,446 1 ,404 0,289 0,095 
31  Vehicle bod'jwork and equipment 1,561 1.541 0,354 0,142 
32 Shipbuilding 1 ,319  0,307 0.1 5 1  
33 Other transport equipment 1 ,665 0,405 0,127 
34 Textile fibres 1,195 0, 1 69 
35 Textiles 1,462 1 ,327 0,271 0,148 
36 Other textiles 1,470 0,333 0.143 
37 Dress-making 1 ,078 0.210 0,125 
39 Wood and cork industries 1 ,539 1 ,652 0,449 0,127 
40 Paper industry 1 ,5 1 0  0.3 1 3  0,139 
42 Rubber products 1 ,520 1,401 0,297 0,136 
43 Plastic products 1 ,010 0.155 
44 Other manufacturin� industries 1,142 0,137 
45 Electric power prod. and distr. 2,333 0,649 0,3 1 3  
46 Gas prod. and distr. (except pipelines) 1.036 0,209 0,267 
48 Water purification and distribution 0,720 0,249 
49 Preparation of civil engineering works 0.463 0.227 
50 BuildinR and civil enRineering works 0,766 0.139 
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SECTOR DESCRlPTION BS HALL DHP PCM 
53 Rental of building and demolition eqpt 1,018 0,235 
57 Retail trade (except motor vehicles) 1,533 0,387 0,216 
59 Other passenger transports 1,787 0,567 0,198 
61 Other activities related to iand transport 0,730 0,499 
63 Sea transport 1 , 3 1 0  0,253 
65 Other activities reI. to sea and air tranSD. 1,058 0,461 
66 Handling and storage 3,239 3, 170 0,685 0,386 
70 Agricultural and livestock farming 2,530 0,543 0,162 
72 Fishing 4,467 0,780 0,222 
74 Real estate activities 0,945' 0,466 
76 Computer related activities 1 ,017 0,169 
79 Other business activities 2,341 2,368 0,578 0,176 
8 1  Health and veterinary care services 0,472 0,179 
"Hall" coefficients in the table are )l=p/c (I added 1 to the estimated coefiicients, ).1.-1). The 
significance ievels refer 10 the original estimates, �l-l (i.e. indicate if the estimated coefficient 
is significantly different from zero). 
"BS" coefficients are a direct estimate of )l=p/c. The significance levels indicate whether 
the. coefficient is different from zero. 
DRP coefficients in the table are (p-c)lp. For the GMM estimates, all of them are different 




Table 4: Correlations between margin estimates 
BS HALL DHP peM 
BS 1 ,000 0,992 0,942 0,582 
1 ,000 0,902 0,935 0,1 1 5  
28 1 2  2 1  28 
HALL 1,000 0,918 0,654 
1,000 0,990 0,637 
1 8  1 8  1 8  
DHP 1 ,000 0,597 
1,000 0,649 
39 39 
The first entry m each cell reports the simple correlation while the second entry pertams to the 'rank 
correlation. 
The third entry indicates the number of sectors for which the different methodoivgies yielded 
significant results. 
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Table 5: Margin estimates applying TSLS and GMM to (3) and (4), using the 26 sectors 
breakdown of the economy. Constant returns to scale are assumed. 
26 Stttors breakdown DHP DHP IV HALL 
GMM GMM 
1 Extraction of energetic Coefficient 0.932 0.805 2.126' 
Minerals Wald '�sign 0.000 0.000 0.026 
Wald j�s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 1.000 0.992 1.000 
15t autocorr 0.050 0.554 0.406 
2nd autocorr 0.494 0.593 0.232 
2 Extraction of other minerals, Coefficient 0.678 0.712 1.739 
Except energy products Waldj·si� 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Waldj-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
SarR:an test 0.997 0.991 0.987 
1st autocorr 0.164 0.463 0.108 
2nd autocorr 0.452 0.638 0.927 
3 Food, beverages and tobacco Coefficient 0.270 0.290 1.047 
Waldj-sign 0.000 0.000 0.235 
Waldj·s.dum 0.000 0.000 
SarR:an test 0.193 0.022 0.595 
1st autocorr 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2nd autocorr 0.847 0.756 0.227 · 
4 Petroleum refinery and Coefficient 0.095 -0.010' 
Nuclear fuel treatment Waldj-sign 0.003 0.755 
Wald i�s.dum , 
San:tan test 0.186 1.000 
1st autocorr 0.001 0.109 
2nd autocorr 0.884 0.740 
5 Chemical industry Coefficient 0.350 0.280 1:2121 
Waldj-sign 0.000 0.000 0.006 
Waldj-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
SarR:an test 0.585 0.447 0.379 
1st autocorr 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd autocorr 0.135 "0.138 0.125 
6 Other non metallic mineral Coefficient 0.542 0.573 1.352' 
Product industries Waldj-sign 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Waldj·s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sare:an test 0.784 0.285 0.489 
1st autocorr 0.249 0.285 0.067 




























0 . 153  
26 sectors breakdown DHP DHP IV HALL HALL 
GMM GMM IV 
7 Metallurgy and metallic Coefficient 0.289 0.233 1.1701 1.090 
Products Waldj·sign 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.010 
Wald j-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 0.937 0.584 0.232 0.257 
1 st aUlocorr 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd autocorr 0.i38 0.790 0.298 0.209 
8 Mechanical equipment Coefficient 0.312 0.302 1.078' 1.123 
and machinery Waldj·sign 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.003 
Waldj-s.dum 0.)7) 0.001 
Sar1!;an test 0.536 0.635 0.285 0.375 
1st autocorr 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd autocorr 0.065 0.074 0.029 0.056 
9 Electrical, electronic and Coefficient 0.382 0.249 1.159' 1.186' 
Optical material and Wald i-sign 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Equipment Wald ·-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 0.111 0.134 b.179 0.112 
1 st autocorr 0.025 0.004 0.001 0.000 
2nd autocorr 0.875 0.716 0.894 0.848 
10 Transport material Coefficient 0.284 0.326 !.l23' 1.256' 
Waldj·sign 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 
Wald j-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 0.817 0.522 0.372 0.383 
1st autocorr 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
2nd autocorr 0.580 0.478 0. 8 19 0.572 
1 1  Textile industries Coefficient 0.355 0.340 1.000 1.013 
Waldj-sign 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.783 
Wald j·s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 0.151 0.084 0.844 0.866 
1st autocorr 0.001 0.001 0.051 0.039 
2nd autocorr 0 . 1 1 5  0.10) 0.061 0.067 
12 Leather and shoe industry Coefficient 0.128 0.170 -0.042" -0.055' 
Wald i-sign 0.000 0.000 0 . .171 0.004 
Wald . -s.dum 0.00) 0.000 
Sargan test 0.455 0.764 0.625 0.843 
1 st autocorr 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
2nd autocorr 0.963 0.98) 0.)9) 0.458 
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26 sectors breakdown DHP DHP IV HALL HALL 
GMM GMM IV 
13 Wood and cork industries Coefficient 0.278 0.299 1.158 1.204' 
Waldj-sign 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald j-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sa�an test 0.335 0.746 0.202 0.160 
1st autocorr 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd autocorr 0.9i8 0.987 0.364 0.357 
14 Paper industry Coefficient 0.499 0.423 1.245 1.107' 
Wa!dj-sign 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 
Wald j-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Saman test 0.592 0.059 0.058 0.032 
1st autocorr 0.023 0.003 0.000 0.000 
2nd autocorr O.Ogl 0.125 0.685 0.725 
1 5  Rubber and plastic Coefficient 0.244 0.239 1.121' 1.102' 
Products Wald i-si.n 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald j-s.dum 0.001 0.000 
Sall!an test 0.707 0.437 0.122 0.085 
1 st autocorr 0.052 0.064 0.042 0.052 
2nd a'Jtocorr 0.496 0.531 9·442 0.470 
16  Other manufacturing Coefficient 0.282 0.269 0.190' 0.194' 
Industries Wald j-sill,n 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald j-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 0.292 0.199 0.465 0.241 
t st autocorr 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2nd autocorr 0.955 0.992 0.687 0.905 
17 Electric power. gas and Coefficient 0.445 0.462 1.395' 1.543' 
Water production and Waldj-sign 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Distribution Wald j-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sar�an test 0.376 0.368 0.553 0.281 
1 st autocorr 0.099 0.074 0.030 0.027 
2nd autocorr 0.595 0.573 0.423 0.455 
1 8  Water purification and Coefficient 0.432 0.414 1.581 1.745 
Distribution Waldj-sign 0.000 0.000 0 .. 000 0.000 
Wald i-s.dum 0.000 0.000 
Sall!an test 0.953 0.473 0.973 0.435 
1st autocorr 0.035 0.027 0.009 0.010 
2nd autocorr 0.146 0.154 0.063 0.1 86 
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126 sectors breakdown g�� DHPIV -= �L [ 1 9  Building industries 0.458 0.381 0.990' 0.913' 
�
i-sion 0.000 0.000 0.898 0. 1 92 
lid i-s.dum .000 0 .. 00( 
, test 0.99U 0.532 .Jl.§44 .� 
J..sl aulocorr 0.000 0.000 0.120 <CL4 
2nd aulocorr O. J.024 O. 0.1! 
20 Rental, rep�irs, O. 1.346 I 
Wholesale, and retail trade i·si.n .000 0.1 
Wal, i-s.dum O. � IQ. 
Sa ... an lest 0.066 0.000 0.079 OJJQQ.. 
: 51 ,ulocorr O. ).000 0.0 
2nd ).000 0.1 
21 storage and .282' 
Communications .:!!.'. I j-sign 10 J,QQll, 
Wal, I i-s.dum 0.000 _OJlQ<J. I S ....  n lest 0.205 0.123 0.376 O� 
1st aulocorr 0.259 J.2 0.195 0.221 
� 0.890 J.9 U.305 0.251 122 -.:' .,, __ , . 0.4 14 \.lSI I� 
Farming, and hunting Wald i-sion 0.000 0.007 0.00.<>. 
Wald j-s.dum O.UUO �test 0.503 .Jh.8,R � 
1st aulocorr 0.031 0.049 � 
2nd aulocorr 0.078 0.061 � 
-
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26 sectors breakdown 




1 st autocorr 
2nd autocorr 
24 Real estate and other Coefficient 
Business services Wald i-sign 
Wald i-s.dum 
Sarnan test 
1 st autocorr 
2nd autocorr 




1 st autocorr 
2nd autocorr 
I Indicates significance at the 1 % confidence level. 
3 Indicates significant at 10% confidence leveL 
2 Indicates significance at the 5% confidence level. 
� Indicates non significant. 








0.444 0.453 0.574 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 
0.579 0.551 0.568 
0. 1 16 0.108 0.059 
0.282 0.403 0.394 
0.769 0.566 1.4161 
0.000 0.000 0.005 
0.000 0.000 
0.330 0.579 0.608 
0.023 0.335 0.410 
0.040 0.521 0.066 
When no superscript appears, the coefficient is significant at more than the 0.1 % level. 














The significance levels refer to the original estimates, J-l-l (i.e. indicate if the estimated coefficient is 
significantly different from zero). 
DHP coefficients in the table are (P-c)/p. For the GMM estimates, all of them are different from zero at 
the 0.1 % or less significance level. 
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Table 6: Correlations between\estimates of pure profit estimates 
BS HALL DHP PCM 
BS 1 .000 0.973 0.949 0.444 
1 .000 0.874 0.927 0.3 1 1  
28 12 21  28 
HALL 1 .000 0.987 0.484 
1 .000 0.996 0.337 
1 8  1 8  1 8  
DHP 1 .000 0.498 
1 .000 0.348 
39 39 
The first entry in each cell repons the simple correlation while the second entry pertains to the rank 
correlation. 
The third entry indicates the number of sectors for which the different methodologies yielded 
significant results. 
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